expressions used in the first edition of this work, but which had disappeared from the later British editions before the Theodicy was published; we do not think that the statements now made are inconsistent; but even though they were, this would shew merely that we had failed to give a correct expression of the mental facts, and would not prove that both causation and freedom were not to be found in the will, or *ftyfl* these two principles contradicted each other. Mr. B. deals much more in the/uriticism of others, than in the exposition of his own system. In such a subject as the freedom of the will, it is easy to start objections, but not so easy to evolve a doctrine free from all difficulties. Mr. B. has landed himself in many. In order to support his theory, he is obliged to strip causation of its very peculiarities, to make effect mean simply what is effected, and the proposition that every effect has a cause, a mere truism or identical proposition, (see page 66 of Examination of Edwards);—thereby setting himself against the representation of every school of philosophers, whether it be that of Locke or Leibnitz, of Reid, Kant, Brown, or J. S. Mill. (See this defective view noticed in Art. III. p. 523.) The principle of cause and effect is, that whenever we notice anything new or a change, there we look for a cause. But here we have something new, here we have a change, say a mental action, say this volition, and for this we must anticipate a cause. Mr. B. is obliged to deny that cause and effect reach to actions of the mind, thereby setting himself against not only an intuition of our nature, but against experience, which can furnish statistics and anticipations of mental actions, and these voluntary actions—such as crimes, as certain as any physical statistics—such as bills of mortality, and all this surely proves that causation must reign in mind as in matter. According to his scheme, there can be no guarantee, even in the power of God, against the very saints in glory falling away, or even—we use the language reluctantly—in the continuance of the Divine Excellence. He is obliged to acknowledge (Exam. p. 225) that consciousness cannot say, as to any mental act, whether it is, or is not caused, for all that we can be conscious of is the act. But then he says, we are conscious of action, and a thing which acts cannot be caused. There is an obvious mistake here, and indeed in his whole view of action and passion. Surely that which is acted on may itself have power of action.

While preparing this (sixth) edition for the press, we have had presented to us Mr. Mansel's Bampton Lectures on the *' Limits of Eeligious Thought,"—a work characterized by great learning and philosophical ability, and fitted to sap the very foundations of much of the rationalism of the day. "We are grateful for the kindly notices of this work which it contains; we can even say with sincerity, that we are glad that strictures have been offered on some of the positions in this Appendix, as thereby certain important philosophical questions are brought under fair discussion. The strictures relate to three topics:—the nature and

reality of our knowledge through sense-perception and consciousness; the nature of cause or power; and our conviction as to the infinite.

I. He offers strictures on our criticism of the *phenomenality* and *relativity* theories of human knowledge (pp. 367-369). In regard to the former, he acknowledges that Kant has erred,—"jirst, in maintaining that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phenomenal with that of external objects ; and, *secondly,* in dogmatically asserting that the thing in itself does not resemble the phenomenon of which we are conscious." Again, in regard to this first point, we are glad to find him stating —" I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and thinking.